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Abstract—Botnets are collections of infected computers that
are controlled centrally by a botmaster, often for sending spam
or launching denial of service attacks. The task to take down
these botnets is often a cat and mouse game with operators
frequently changing domains for their control infrastructure.
More recently, operators have moved to using Tor, a pseudo-
anonymous network for hosting services whereby identification is
difficult. Additionally, because connections to the Tor network are
encrypted, we cannot use traditional methods like Domain Name
System (DNS) and traffic signatures to detect infected hosts. In
this paper, we introduce TorBot Stalker: the first mechanism
for detecting, de-anonymizing, and destroying Tor botnets. We
use machine learning to analyse and fingerprint the timings
and frequency of Tor network circuit data when routing botnet
traffic, and build a detection mechanism that is able to identify
infected hosts at the Tor network border, in real-time, while
preserving the privacy of legitimate users. TorBot Stalker can be
implemented at any node in the Tor network and can differentiate
between botnets and legitimate applications like Internet Relay
Chat (IRC) coming from the same host. Experimental data
demonstrates an accuracy of 99% with few false positives. We
then apply the technique at the entry to the Tor network to
measure the fraction of traffic which is for botnet. We observed
that Torbot Stalker is able to de-anonymize real botnets in the Tor
network and further identify infected hosts and control servers.
Index Terms—malware, botnet detection, Tor, machine learn-
ing, traffic analysis, circuit fingerprinting, deanonymization
I. INTRODUCTION
Botnets are collections of infected computers (bots) that can
be remotely controlled by the botmaster through a command
and control (C&C) server. They contribute to the majority of
the distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, spam, bank-
ing trojans, ransomware, and other malicious activities [1].
Botnets are frequently sold or rented on hacking forums
allowing even poorly resourced actors to use them. Botnets
are usually classified into three types depending on their C&C
infrastructure. In the centralised infrastructure, the C&C server
communicates with the bots from a central location as seen
with IRC botnets. If the botnet is detected, the takedown of
the servers constitutes a single point of failure. The second
type is the distributed or decentralized architecture where bots
do not communicate with a single server but with each other
using a peer-to-peer (P2P) network. Although bots can still
be detected, this architecture is more resilient to takedown,
as the discovery and the takedown of one bot does not result
in the takedown of the whole botnet, since other bots have
many options to connect to. Conficker, Waladec, and Zeus
P2P are examples of this type [2]. The third type is the hybrid
architecture, which may opt to either communicate through
one of the mechanisms and use the other when one fails, or
they may opt to use both systems together. This method may
provide more resilience to Sybil attacks [3], a frequent attack
against P2P networks, and hence improve the reliability of
the botnet in a situation where peers become unavailable or
compromised. They are more difficult to setup and control.
Although there are a variety of detection schemes, botmas-
ters have recently created two problems for detection. First,
they use legitimate applications, protocols, and encryption
to hide malicious traffic. Secondly, they regularly move the
location of the C&C server by either generating multiple
domains or physically changing the location resulting in a
cat-and-mouse game between law enforcement/cybersecurity
organizations and the botmasters. This could also be a difficult
task for the botmasters coupled with the risk of losing control
of the entire botnet if the location of the C&C server is
discovered. Recently, there has been an abuse of anonymity
and mix networks like Tor to evade detection and anonymize
the location of the C&C servers. The use of Tor makes it
impossible for traditional network-based methods to detect
botnets due to specific protocol usage, encryption, anonymity
of IP addresses, same traffic features for both legitimate
and illegitimate traffic, and lack of domain name system
(DNS) requests. Tor also ensures that the C&C servers remain
anonymous by routing traffic through several relays across the
Tor network.
In this paper, we present TorBot Stalker, the first practical
network-based technique for detecting botnet and periodic
communication routed through Tor. Our technique involves
the use of circuit traffic fingerprinting and machine learning
to classify Tor circuits to either web or botnet activity. Botnet
and IRC communication can be accurately and effectively de-
anonymized and terminated in real-time and further lead to the
discovery of infected hosts, C&C servers, and IRC servers. It
can be implemented from a single Tor entry node without the
need of a global passive adversary.
Contributions: i). We introduce the first network-based
method for detecting and de-anonymizing Tor botnets using
machine learning to effectively classify statistical fingerprints
extracted from Tor circuit data; ii). We propose an efficient and
generally applicable method for extracting unknown normal
and randomized periodic intervals from a time series mixed
with noisy and background data; iii). We present a technique
for identifying whether the detected communication originated
from a host or a server.
Roadmap: Section 2 provides the reader with a background
overview in Tor botnets. Section 3 discusses previous and
relevant related work. Section 4 introduces TorBot Stalker, our
technique for de-anonymizing Tor botnets. Section 5 describes
our data collection methods, experiments and results. Section
6 evaluates our results and real world detection. We propose
improvements and conclude in Section 8.
II. THE RISE OF TOR BOTNETS
Tor is an anonymity system which allows users to anony-
mously connect to web services or service providers by
building three-hop circuits consisting of a guard, middle, and
exit relay [4]. By using the Diffie-Hellman exchange to create
secure keys, it ensures that relays know only the identities
which are directly connected to it. This provides a form
of layered encryption whereby confidentiality, integrity, and
anonymity is guaranteed. When connecting to normal Internet
services like HTTP, FTP, or telnet, the exit servers are the
final layer where the packets are fully decrypted and sent
out as normal. Therefore, where there are no other forms
of encryption like TLS or end-to-end encryption, there is
no guarantee of confidentiality or integrity between the exit
servers and normal internet services.
Tor allows users to offer onion or hidden services which
are secure ways where users can host web services without
revealing both the original source and final destination of the
circuits at any point. It works by the hidden services adver-
tising their existence in the Tor network by randomly picking
some relays, building circuits to them, and asking them to act
as introduction points using its public keys. The hidden service
then sends a service descriptor which contains its public key
and a summary of each introduction point to a distributed hash
table. When a client wants to connect to a hidden service,
it creates a circuit to a randomly picked relay which would
become its rendezvous point. The client then downloads the
descriptor of the onion service from the distributed hash table
and selects an introductory point from the list. The client
sends an introduction message (which includes the address
of the rendezvous point) to the selected introductory point
asking it to be delivered to the onion service. The hidden
service then creates a circuit to the rendezvous point and
the rendezvous point (RP) notifies the client of a successful
connection establishment. As seen in Fig. 1, the client and the
hidden service would now communicate with each other by
using the rendezvous point as an intermediary.
Despite several attacks on Tor such as statistical and con-
firmation attacks which are done by closely monitoring the
timings of the packets at different nodes in Tor [5], [6],
Tor remains a popular choice for botnets to hide their C&C
servers [7] because it makes the C&C servers anonymous
and setting up any botnet to use Tor is easy. The tradi-
tional methods for detecting botnets at the network through
signatures, DNS analysis, anomalies, and traffic analysis are
insufficient because Tor uses encryption and the previously
known distinguishing features for botnets like the type of
protocol used, port numbers, IP addresses, and packet size are
the same with the normal traffic features making malicious
traffic appear legitimate. Botnet C&C servers like Sefnit and
a modified version of Zeus (called Skynet) have become
problematic, receiving the highest number of hidden service
requests in Tor [7]. A Skynet botnet C&C server analyzed
was found to have between 12,000 to 30,000 infected hosts
connecting to it [8]. Tor botnets led to a frequent spike and
sudden increase in Tor traffic as seen with the Mevade Botnet
[9], creating latency problems for Tor users.
Preliminary observations reveal that they are similar in
communication patterns with normal botnets but the use of
Tor hides their activities in the network. For example, the
Zyklon botnet communicates to the C&C server by sending
an encrypted HTTP POST request to the C&C hidden service
and has similar malicious capabilities like other botnets. The
request may either contain ex-filtrated data or may be a ping
at a specified interval to inform the hidden service that it is
presently online. Like normal botnets, Tor botnets periodically
attempt to communicate (ping) with the C&C server with a
small payload size. Zyklon would send only the IP address
and computer name at a set interval. Botnets are likely to
have only one cell for a ping even if the payload is increased
because Tor uses 512 bytes per cell. This uniformity in botnet
communication has been previously explored [10] but existing
methods which rely only on this periodicity would be rendered
ineffective where there is noisy/background data or where
the counts and timings of the botnets are randomized. The
background data could comprise of commands, downloads, or
updates sent by the server or client or could be random noise
intended to disrupt traditional timing analysis. For randomiza-
tion, either the timing or the quantity of the regular periodic
control data could be made unsystematic.
III. RELATED WORK
Botnets can be detected on the hosts with the use of sig-
nature recognition by anti-viruses or Host Intrusion Detection
Systems (HIDS) [11]. However, many host-based detection
tools only detect known malware samples (and variants) [12]
and many computers do not have any kind of protection [13].
Botnets can also be detected in the network through traffic
signature recognition [14], based on network anomalies [10],
DNS [15], and data mining [16].
To our knowledge, this is the first network-based technique
for detecting Tor botnets. However, the application of web
2
fingerprinting and statistical analysis for de-anonymizing Tor
Hidden Services has been applied even recently. Circuit finger-
printing attacks use circuit data to efficiently identify a user’s
involvement with hidden services with an accuracy of 88%
and further identify which hidden service a user is involved
with from a set of hidden services known to the attacker
with a 99% accuracy [17]. This method is suitable only to
web services which have a relatively fixed web page size and
assumes that the hidden service does not have a noisy stream.
Another method uses traffic confirmation attacks where an
attacker controls the entry guard to the hidden service as well
as the entry guard to the host and can confirm similar timings.
However, this is only feasible by a global passive adversary
with control of a substantial number of entry guards.
Some have attempted to deal with the problem indirectly.
TorPolice uses the circuit creation failure rates caused by the
botnets to detect and mitigate botnet abuse of Tor [18]. This
method fails to detect botnets before the abuse and when they
do not attack Tor. Torward is an IDS to detect and classify
malicious traffic including botnet traffic at an exit router of
the Tor network. The defense system then processes these IDS
alerts and blocks suspected connections [19]. Unfortunately,
most Tor botnets use hidden services which do not use exit
servers. Also, rulesets and signatures would not adequately
detect unknown botnets [20].
One method attempts to cluster similar periodic commu-
nications allowing security analysts to focus on a few likely
malicious targets [21] compared to previous methods which
attempt to directly detect botnets based on only their period-
icity [22] [23], [24]. A method further categorized the patterns
based on non-periodic, weakly-periodic, and strongly-periodic,
and achieved an accuracy of 80% [25]. This approach fails
to consider legitimate web applications like IRC which have
strong periodic patterns and the misclassification of 20% of the
traffic could have severe consequences and block legitimate
applications. A proper solution for Tor botnet detection would
be a detection mechanism that runs in real time and detects
botnet traffic with an accuracy close to 100%.
IV. TORBOT STALKER
We describe a real-time system for collecting Tor circuit
data, arranging them into flows and analyzing them for patterns
using machine learning. It is capable of detecting periodic
patterns even in the midst of noisy traffic and does not
constitute any additional network overhead as the traffic is
merely intercepted within the host. It is most effective at
the entry node to the Tor network but can be used at any
node in the network. It is able to further distinguish between
applications which have similar traffic patterns such as IRC,
web pages which would regularly reload, and botnets. TorBot
Stalker was developed and tested using Weka [26] and Python.
Fig. 1 shows the flow of the system and each component is
described in the following subsections.
A. Tor Circuit Logger
The Tor Circuit Logger collects cell data on a Tor relay,
recording the number of cells, inter-arrival times, IP addresses
and circuit IDs. We do this by modifying the official Tor relay
source code to send this information to a monitoring process
in real time. We exclude the create and destroy cells since they
are unnecessary for detection.
B. Tor Circuit Flows
The cell times are then distributed into a netflow-like
structure where cell times CTn belonging to the same source
IP, destination IP, and unique circuit identifier are classified
in the same flow Fn. Tor is used to connect to normal web
services through exit servers or to a hidden service (onion
address). In the former, the same circuit ID is used for different
services, while in the latter, each hidden service has its own
unique circuit ID. The use of separate IDs helps to differentiate
between hidden services and further reduce noise. In both
cases, the same circuit is reused for as long as the connection
is not closed. Applications like IRC Chat can reuse the same
circuit for as long as possible. By default, when connections to
hidden services are closed and re-established, the same circuit
is used for new connections for up to 10 minutes after which
the circuit is changed.
C. Cell Aggregation, Grouping, and Time Segregation
In each flow, consecutive cell times CTn which are close
to each other where CTi < CT(i−1)+i are clustered and the
mean of the cells is calculated as a unique cell UCn. The
total number of the cells making the unique cell is summed
as the unique cell count UCC. The value of plus/minus 2
seconds is used to determine if a cell is close to the next
as it is a fair interval to account for separate activities while
making room for network lags especially in the case of chat
protocols that could have constant cells. For example, [10,
11, 12, 13, 20, 21, 22, 23, 30, 31, 32, 33] become [11.5,
21.5, 31.5]; the cells with timestamps 10, 11, 12 and 13 were
clustered as a unique cell with timestamp 11.5 and a unique
cell count of 4. Cell aggregation is done to group events
together and ease the extraction of features. All unique cells
with the same counts are grouped together GC since periodic
communications are likely to have the same number of counts.
Cells having the same count are further segregated into 12
minute time windows and passed separately to the interval
miner. 12 minutes is used to capture all possible times within
a short-lived circuit.
D. Interval Miner
The interval miner is developed in Python and can detect
multiple regular intervals even in the midst of noise. It
works by checking if particular periodic patterns exist within
the time window. First, the time difference (TD) of every
possible two combinations in the window is calculated using
the itertools.combination function in Python. Time differences
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Fig. 1. TorBot Stalker Flow
which occur 3 or more times are then auto-matched with
existing times in the list of unique cells. A variation of
plus/minus 2 seconds is also employed to make up for possible
network lags or issues that occur in real-world detection.
The matched times are then extracted as regular occurring
communication. Duplicated intervals are also removed from
the matching list. The interval miner function is also applied
to the entire timeseries to take into consideration instances
where the unique cell count is distorted.
1 f o r x , y i n i t e r t o o l s . c o m b i n a t i o n s (GC, 2 ) :
2 di f f GC . append ( y−x )
3 f o r a i n di f f GC :
4 i = GC[GC. i n d e x ( a ) ]
5 w h i l e i < GC[−1] :
6 i f i +k or i +k−1 or i +k+1 or i +k−2 i n GC:
7 i f i i n match [ k , a ] :
8 match [ k , a ] . append ( i + k )
9 e l s e :
10 match [ k , a ] = [ a , i +k ]
11 i +=k
Listing 1. Pattern Matching
E. Statistical features extraction
From the training data, we extracted 32 statistical features/
circuit patterns based on the count and inter-arrival times of the
inbound and outbound cells respectively. We extract features
for the detected periodic intervals as well as the entire cell
times within a given time window to cover for situations where
due to noise or randomization, periodic cells with different
counts are left out. For count based features, we calculate: (a)
the total number of cells within the window where
∑ |CT1 :
CT | and the total number of unique cells ∑ |UC1 : UC|, (b)
the total no of unique cells within the longest interval in the
group count, if any; (c) the mean of the counts for all unique
cells, where mean of counts is
∑n
i=2(UCCi)
n− 1
(d) the 1st and 2nd count of the Unique Cells within the
longest interval UC1 and UC2, and (e) the group count GC.
Count based features help us to exploit the fact that different
applications would exhibit different count behaviours. We
observed that in the case of the Zyklon botnet, we find a
consistency of 6 inbound and 5 outbound cells. The inbound
cells consist of 3 relay cells, 1 begin cell, one HTTP GET cell
and a HTTP POST cell. In the case of IRC, after a successful
connection to a channel, we find a consistency of 1 inbound
and 1 outbound cell which corresponds to the pings and pongs
exchanged between the client and server. In the case of the
telnet botnet we find 2 inbound and 2 outbound cells, and in
the case of the TCP and telnet botnet, we find a consistency
of 2 inbound cells.
For the time-based features, we calculate the total duration
of the cells within the time window which is CT − CT1, as
well as the duration of the group count and the longest interval
in all cells, if any. We also use the longest interval detected,
the mean and the standard deviation of the time differences
between all cells (CTD), the longest interval in all cells and
the longest interval in the group counts, respectively, where
the mean is ∑n
i=2(CTD1 − CTDi−1)
n− 1
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and the standard deviation is√√√√ 1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(CTDi − CTD)2
Time-based features such as the duration of the inbound
and outbound cells are used since botnet and circuits to
web hidden services would usually not last longer than ten
minutes compared to IRC circuits and a TCP-botnet which
had long-lived connections. Our preliminary study revealed
that different protocols were bound to have variations in the
duration and size of the inbound and outbound cells. Also,
persistent continuous communication are usual characteristics
of botnet or IRC activity since they need to regularly get
information from the C&C server. IRC would also naturally
have a 30 second or 1 minute interval compared to botnets
which could have different intervals.
We further attempt to extract features which could predict
randomized botnets by calculating the average amount and
duration of activity for each window. Our first metric is the
division the total number of cells by the mean of all unique
cells where ∑ |CT1 : CT |
(
∑n
i=2(UCi)
n−1 )
Secondly, we divide the total duration by the mean of all
unique cell counts.
CT − CT1
(
∑n
i=2(UCCi)
n−1 )
F. Application Classifier
Using the Random Forest machine learning algorithm, the
statistical features extracted from the periodic patterns are used
to build a model based on a training data-set we describe
below. Based on the trained dataset, the resulting model clas-
sifies the circuit flow into one of the following three classes:
Normal (N), HTTP botnet (HTTPB), TCP botnet (TCPB),
Telnet botnet (TB), IRC (IRC) or Web. Machine learning helps
to find and predict patterns without explicitly programming
or developing an algorithm. The extracted features are fed
into the model built from the algorithm and it is executed in
Weka through a modified Python script based on Python Weka
Wrapper [27]. The Random Forest algorithm was chosen based
on the experimental results which are reported in Section V.
G. Hidden Service/ Host classifier
Next, we determine if the non-Tor IP address involved
belongs to a hidden service or a host by recording the
direction of the circuit. Here we attempt to extract the sequence
pattern/direction of the circuits. This is important because first,
only the hidden servers have onion addresses and only the
hosts can initiate a connection since the hidden services do
not know how to reach the hosts. This helps us to track down
which IP addresses are hosts and which are hidden services
after detection. Our observations revealed that a circuit belongs
to a server if the 1st cell is an inbound and vice-versa. Torbot
Stalker needs to be implemented at an entry node for this
stage and the next stages. We first cross-check the IP addresses
involved against the Tor consensus list and determine whether
the first cell was an inbound or outbound one.
H. Intelligence gathering and Terminator
We gather information about the participant including the
geolocation, open ports, and reputation score to determine the
botnet use. In cases where a public IP address belongs to a
hidden service, we attempt to connect to web links associated
with C&C panels. The detected IP addresses belonging to
botnet are also added to a shared list. The list of botnet IPs are
automatically blocked by automatically updating the network
firewall/iptable rules on the entry node where TorBot Stalker
is implemented. This list is added to a central database and
shared by nodes. The next section describes the experiments
that were run to identify the best machine learning algorithm
for detecting botnets.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Botnet detection research has suffered from a lack of
proper description of the data, methodology, and evaluation of
results. We attempt to make our detection system repeatable,
feasible, and easy to implement in a real-world scenario. We
follow several standard malware data collection for machine
learning guidelines [28]–[30] and provide the methodology for
repeatable comparison and evaluation.
A. Data Collection
We used circuit dataset generated by browsing random
onion sites [17] as well as capture web traffic data as re-
alistically as possible to real human user activity by using
Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, and the Tor browser to
physically visit a variety of web and onion sites including
social networks, forums, sports, video streams, audio streams,
and WikiLeaks. Audio stream data from the Spotify ap-
plication is obtained from real human user activity. Video
streams are obtained from YouTube as well as other video
streaming websites. Web services which have regular intervals
or regularly refresh the browsers are included in the normal
web data. Non-malicious Telnet, FTP, and SSH connections
are also made from various computers and recorded. For
IRC chat, data is obtained by connecting to several channels
with varying activity on an anonymized IRC server. In a
safe environment, circuit data is collected from various botnet
protocols and families including HTTP, Telnet, and TCP all
of which are routed through Tor. We captured circuit traffic
data for different ping intervals from the botnet including 30
seconds, 1,2,3,4 minutes and a randomized time of 10 - 45
seconds in the case of the random botnet to represent different
possible scenarios. 10 - 45 seconds was used as they were the
times used by randomized botnets found on Github. For the
purposes of training the model, we collected data for a period
of 12 minutes although Telnet and botnet circuits were closed
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after ten minutes because they are short-lived. We collected 12
minutes to discover long-lived connections which last longer
than 10 minutes. Different percentages for the distribution of
classes were experimented with but none of them made a
significant change on the results.
B. Experiments and Results
In our first technique, we extracted 34 features as described
above based on the results from the Interval Miner and
classify the different types of intervals retrieved into HTTP
Botnet, TCP Botnet, Telnet Botnet, IRC, and web intervals.
Our second technique avoids the use of the Interval Miner
and extracts 8 count-based features from the circuit data and
classifies them into HTTP Botnet, TCP Botnet, Telnet Botnet,
IRC, and web traffic. The features used are the total number of
cells, total number of unique cells, and the mean and standard
deviation of the time differences of the unique cells from the
inbound and outbound circuits respectively. We experimented
with several algorithms, including Decision Trees, Rules,
Functions, Bayesian Approaches, Support Vector Machine,
Nearest Neighbor and Regression; we report the results for
the best two algorithms, which were the random forest and the
J48 decision tree algorithm. The J48 decision tree algorithm
is based on Quinlan’s C4.5 algorithm and makes decisions
based on a tree-like graph structure [31]. Decision Trees is
said to perform better on well-defined problems and has been
previously successful in classifying botnet traffic with low
false positives [32], [28]. Random Forest [33] which is classed
as belonging to decision tree approaches, is also used. Random
Forest is an ensemble learning algorithm, i.e. it uses several
learner models to perform the classification; it constructs a
multitude of decision trees during the training process and
outputs the mode of the classes or the mean prediction of
the individual trees as the final result. Logistic, Rules, Lazy
and Bayes classification algorithms are not reported because
they either performed poorly on our dataset or were slower.
For the purposes of detection, we require an algorithm with
a high performance in order to meet our requirement for a
real-time detection.
To identify the most promising algorithms we used ten-
fold cross-validation; as mentioned previously, we report the
results for the top two, which are the J48 and Random Forest
algorithms. Table II shows the cross-validation results for
the two experiments, reporting the performance both overall
(accuracy, precision, recall and F-measure), as well as per
class (precision, recall and F-measure) of the two algorithms.
These metrics take values between 0 (the poorest performance)
and 1 (the highest performance). For ease of understanding,
we transform these in percentages. All algorithms performed
well, with both Random Forest and J48 having an accuracy
higher than 98% and low false positives (FP) for all the classes.
For the first experiment, the J48 decision tree algorithm has a
98.16% accuracy and a low false positive rate of 0.2 %, 2.0%,
0.3%,0.2%, 0.3% and 1.2% for TCP, Telnet, HTTPB, IRC, and
Web Intervals, respectively. Random forest performed slightly
better with an overall accuracy of 99.63%, and a low false
positive rates of 0.1%, 0.2%, 0%, 0.1%,0.1%, and 0.1%. For
the second experiment, J48 had an accuracy of 98.29% and
a low false positive rate of 0.5%, 1.3%, 0.3%, 0.2%, 0.2%,
and 0.8% for TCP botnet, Telnet botnet, HTTP Botnet, IRC,
and web traffic. Random Forest also performed better with
an accuracy of 99.8% and either low false positives of either
0.1% or no false positives.
An interesting observation is that out of the 182 randomized
botnet circuits of 10 - 45 seconds, the interval miner with
a variance of 2 seconds was still able to detect some form
of regular periodic intervals in 134 circuits. These included
longer intervals not anticipated by the botnet. For the first
experiment, we find that Random Forest perfectly classified the
randomized botnets with other botnets while the J48 algorithm
misclassified four of the randomized botnets but only one as a
web interval. In the second experiment, J48 misclassifed four
of the randomized botnets into the wrong botnet categories
but not as normal web traffic or IRC. Random forest perfectly
classified random botnets. For the first experiment, there were
1085 instances and J48 predicted 1065 correctly while Ran-
dom forest correctly classified 1081. In the second experiment,
there where 1347 instances with the J48 correctly classifying
1324 while Random Forest correctly classified 1345. These
results show that although the second technique works better
and is able to predict the type of botnet traffic, the interval
miner helps to make the detection of periodic communication
faster and more effective. TorBot Stalker also has a very low
false positive rate when classifying web traffic ensuring that
legitimate traffic is not blocked.
We further attempted to perform a practical evaluation of
how the second technique would perform in an application
environment by collecting a separate dataset where the ground
truth is known and correctly labeled. The algorithms are
trained and the new dataset is used as a supplied test set.
With the supplied test dataset, Random Forest also performed
best and predicted 99% of the classes accurately with no false
positives for the normal web and IRC data, and 0.38% for
botnet data which was misclassified as normal data. J48 also
came close in second place with no false positives for normal
or IRC data and a 98% accuracy.
VI. DISCUSSION
With the increase in the exploitation of legitimate services
by botnets, it is impossible to have an all-in-one solution for
botnets. TorBot Stalker is protocol specific but the methods
could be applied in other environments. Our approach employs
a machine learning algorithm for the detection of botnet traffic
patterns in real time and preserves the privacy of its users. Our
experimental results show that the majority of botnet traffic
instances are detected and unlikely to block legitimate traffic.
TorBot Stalker accurately detected all the current and popular
Tor botnets tested and is designed to detect unknown current
botnets which have a similar communication architecture. Our
solution can determine specific applications experimented with
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TABLE I
CROSS VALIDATION RESULTS FOR 1ST TECHNIQUE
J48 Random Forest
Accuracy 98.2% 99.6%
Precision 98.1% 99.6%
Recall 98.2% 99.6%
F-Measure 98.1% 99.6%
TCP Telnet HTTPB IRC WEB TCP Telnet HTTPB IRC WEB
Precision 99.2% 98.3% 98.3% 96.5% 66.7% 99.6% 99.8% 100% 98.2% 87.5%
Recall 95.8% 99.3% 100% 98.2% 60% 100% 100% 100% 98.2% 70%
F-Measure 97.5% 98.8% 99.1% 97.3% 63.2% 99.8% 99.9% 100% 98.2% 77.8%
TABLE II
CROSS VALIDATION RESULTS FOR 2ND TECHNIQUE
J48 Random Forest
Accuracy 98.3% 99.9%
Precision 98.3% 99.9%
Recall 98.3% 99.9%
F-Measure 98.3% 99.9%
TCP Telnet HTTPB IRC WEB TCP Telnet HTTPB IRC WEB
Precision 98.1% 98.6% 97.7% 97.4% 98.8% 100% 99.8% 100% 99.2% 100%
Recall 98.1% 99.2% 97.7% 94.9% 98.2% 99.6% 100% 100% 100% 99.4%
F-Measure 98.1% 98.9% 97.7% 96.1% 98.5% 99.8% 99.9% 100% 99.6% 99.7%
and it is the first method to apply fingerprinting methods on
periodic intervals in Tor.
Previous Tor fingerprinting methods have focused on de-
anonymizing web services. In comparison to other finger-
printing methods, we achieve a higher accuracy of 99.8%
and our method can deal with the issue of noise as well
as randomization. We have achieved a higher accuracy than
other works involved in detecting periodic intervals while
solving the problem of noisy and randomized data where
previous autocorrelation functions have failed. TorBot Stalker
has substantially improved upon Tor fingerprinting methods by
extending its application to botnet and IRC traffic and differs
from previous periodicity detection because it accurately pre-
dicts the application involved. To reinforce the effectiveness of
our interval miner, we test its ability to detect regular intervals
from a wide range of time streams. We randomly generate
20000 lists. Each of them contains 30-50 randomly generated
numbers from the range of 1-200. Regular periodic times with
an interval of 10 were inserted and our interval miner was
tested on it. Multiple intervals of 15, and 17 are also inserted
to determine its effectiveness in detecting multiple intervals.
The results show that our interval miner detected all of the
intervals plus additional intervals generated from the random
data. We further evaluated the performance of TorBot Stalker
in the real-world by collecting and analyzing circuit data from
a Tor entry node, using the Circuit Logger. In a timeline of
45 minutes, TorBot Stalker detected that 3.44% of the circuits
analyzed were botnets, 0.57% were for IRC communication,
and the remaining were normal circuits.
One weakness of Torbot Stalker is its difficulty in detecting
very long periodic intervals where the botnet has a short-lived
connection of 10 minutes. This is because the circuit paths /
IDs will change and another relay will be used. However, this
would lead to greater inefficiency for the botnet as botmasters
need to know which bots are alive and bots need to be ready
to receive commands as soon as they are issued. Secondly,
botmasters could easily force Tor to change its circuit path for
every time it sends data. This would ensure that there are no
intervals to analyze. This problem can be solved by analysing
network packets at ISPs and local networks rather than Tor
circuits at an entry relay.
VII. FUTURE WORK AND CONCLUSION
For Torbot Stalker to be most disruptive, it needs to be
implemented by a substantial number of relays. This is because
if a relay blocks a bot, the bot will simply connect to another
relay. A framework for a widespread implementation needs
to be developed and possibly included as an option in the
Tor source code. Currently, Tor’s policy is that all relays
must accept all inbound and forward all outbound connections.
However, the benefits of blocking botnets including speeding
up the network and disrupting malicious activities to the Tor
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network and relay operators cannot be underestimated. Sec-
ondly, a framework for intelligence sharing on botnets across
relays can help increase the speed of detection by first looking
up a list of IPs involved in recent botnet communication.
IP addresses which are heavily involved could be possibly
associated with the C&C servers. Future work would also
collect and analyze network packet data to increase the scope
of data collection to any host which can intercept network
traffic including ISPs, routers, firewalls, IDS, and sensors.
Packets can also be blocked through the use of an added
network layer. Network packet analysis would also reveal
persistent and long-lasting connections from hosts to Tor nodes
even when they are randomized or the circuit path is changed
regularly since the host IP address does not change.
The rise of undetectable stealthy botnets is imminent and
there is a great need for a proactive solution which is proto-
col specific. In this paper, we have described the detection
problems created by botnets using Tor for communication
and we have presented and evaluated the first network-based
technique for de-anonymizing and disrupting Tor botnets.
We have described how circuit data is effectively collected,
analysed, and classified using the Random Forest machine
learning classifier. Our results have shown that TorBot Stalker
can detect Tor botnets with a higher accuracy where other
approaches cannot.
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